Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) has been brought out to revolutionize driving experiences and traffic flow control systems. In a VANET, roadside units (RSUs) are usually used to collect messages sent by nearby vehicles, which may include status information of vehicles and emergency events. Currently, batch verification is considered as an effective approach to verify these messages in VANETs. However, in existing batch verification scheme, the batch verification fails even one of the signed messages is invalid. In this paper, we introduce an efficient identity-based fault-tolerant batch verification scheme for cloud assisted VANETs.
Introduction
With the rapid advancements in wireless communication technologies, telecommunication manufactures and vehicle industries recently have realized the evolution of the intelligent transportation systems (ITSs). VANETs are known as special wireless communication networks that enhance driving experience and support road safety, traffic efficiency, automatic toll collection. A VANET mainly consists of vehicles and infrastructures (i.e., roadside units (RSUs)). The dedicated short range communication (DSRC) protocol is employed for wireless communications in VANETs. Communications in VANETs can be classified into three catalogs, namely: Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R) and Roadside-to-Vehicle (R2V) communications.
With the increasing number of vehicles, huge number of messages will be collected by RSUs, such that traditional traffic analysis system will not be competent for the traffic analysis task. Cloud assisted VANET is a promising approach that can take cloud computing to serve the VANET, since cloud computing can provide computational services for traffic analysis and ensure the real-time requirement due to the great storage and computing power of cloud [1] . Furthermore, cloud assisted VANET provides a technically feasible incorporation of ITSs and cloud computing for better road safety and secures intelligent urban traffic systems [2] , [3] .
Security and privacy are two crucial concerns in cloud assisted VANETs [4] , [5] . Firstly, the messages sent to the cloud should be authenticated and non-repudiation. Secondly, these messages may contain car owners' sensitive information. Therefore, vehicular communications have to consider car owners' privacy. Thirdly, if a legitimate vehicle sends false or even malicious messages, the real identity of the vehicle must be traceable. To address the above security and privacy requirements, digital signatures and pseudo identities are usually employed [6] , [7] .
In this paper, we propose a fault-tolerant batch verification (FTBV) scheme for cloud assisted VANETs, which is based on the basic construction in [9] . In FTBV, each vehicle has to register at the TA before communicating with RSUs. With a set of pseudo identities and corresponding private keys from the TA, the vehicle signs messages before sending them to nearby RSUs. When an RSU receives the signed messages, it needs to verify the validly of these signed messages before transferring them to the cloud for analyzing. As to the efficiency, aggregate signature is used in [9] . In our scheme, we extend it to the batch verification of signatures. And a d-cover-free-family is used to construct the fault-tolerant batch verification mechanism. By this mechanism, we can find fault signatures in all signatures if the number of fault signatures is no more than d. Hence, a list of validly signed messages can be verified and invalid messages will be excluded.
Background

Design Goals
Many attacks may threat our system (e.g., message modification, privacy stealing [3] ). To address these attacks, we have to consider security and privacy features such as privacy, non-repudiation and traceability [10] . Besides these features, we also aim to address the following two challenges:
Efficiency: The validity of signatures on received messages can be verified at the same time by using the batch verification, which improves the efficiency of verification.
Fault Tolerance: In existing batch verification scheme, a single invalid signature makes the whole batch verification invalid.
D-Cover-Free Families and Fault-Tolerant Batch Verification
A d-cover-free family consists of a set B of n elements and a set S of m subsets of elements in B. For any d subsets and all distinct , it holds that Here we can use an incidence matrix to describe the relationship of . We assume ,
. We define the as follows:
We use a simple example to describe a fault-tolerant batch verification [9] using the d-cover-free family. In this example, we assume there are 6 signatures which are needed to be verified. If there is a fault signature in these signatures, we can find out all valid signatures. By realizing the fault-tolerant batch verification scheme, we detect . To achieve this, we choose 4 subsets . Consider the following matrix for which .
For the matrix above, the 1 entries in column j indicate in which the signature is contained. Finally, batch verification for signatures in can be formed as: , , , We assume that only one signature is faulty, then any other signature is already included in a correct batch verification. If we assume is a fault signature. We can know that are valid through . So we can output all valid signatures if there is only one faulty signature by using this d-cover-free family.
Our Scheme
As shown in Fig. 1 , our system architecture mainly consists of a cloud center (CC), a trusted authority (TA), RSUs and vehicles. And our scheme consists of three stage: Setup, Vehicle Registration, and Vehicular Communication.
Setup In this step, the TA initializes the parameters for the whole system. It generates the system master key and the system public parameters.
Vehicle Registration All the vehicles have to register at the TA before communicating with others. First, a vehicle sends its real identity to the TA, then the TA computes some pseudo identities and corresponding private keys, public keys for the vehicle. At last, the TA sends pseudo identities, private keys and public keys back to the vehicle and stores these data locally.
Vehicular Communication There are three phases in this section: Signature Generation, Fault-Tolerant Batch Verification and Trace. First, a vehicle signs a message before sending it. Then a fault-tolerant batch verification is used to verify messages received from some vehicles. Finally, if there is a fake message, the TA can trace the real identity of the message generator. 
Setup
At this stage, TA initializes the system parameters. On input a security parameter l, the TA chooses cyclic additive groups and cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q, so there exists a bilinear map [8] , where are generated by ; selects three hash functions:
; picks as the secret master key, and computes as the master public key.
Vehicle Registration
At this stage, the TA extracts m pseudo identities and corresponding private keys for each vehicle. When a legitimate vehicle registers with the TA, it submits its real identity to the TA through a secure channel. Then TA generates the pseudo identities and corresponding private keys for as follows:
1) For , compute pseudo identities , where t is a time period. 2) For , compute as the public keys of , computes as the private keys of .
3) Manage a member list with the form , and the TA sends to the vehicle through a secure channel.
Vehicle Communication
At this stage, vehicles communicate with nearby RSUs to share the safety messages about their driving conditions. First, a vehicle needs to sign a message before sending it to nearby RSUs. Then, when an RSU receives some messages from vehicles in a certain time period, the RSU should verify the signatures corresponding to these messages within a short period of time. Here we use a fault-tolerant batch verification technique to realize efficient signature verification.
Signature Generation
Before sending a message to an RSU, a vehicle first signs on this message using its private key . picks a random , computes , computes , sends to the RSU, where , where , .
Fault-Tolerant Batch Verification
When an RSU receives a number of messages from nearby vehicles over a period of time, it needs to verify the validity of these messages before sending these messages to the cloud for analyzing. And according to the DSRC protocol [1] , each vehicle has to broadcast a safety message every 100-300 ms. Thus batch verification should be used here to accelerate signature verification. But if an RSU uses an ordinary batch verification scheme to verify n messages, just one invalid signature will make the whole verification equation invalid even if this is just a transmission error. Here we use a fault-tolerant batch verification to dispose this problem. In [9] , a fault-tolerant batch verification scheme for aggregate signatures is proposed which is based on d-cover-free families. In such a construction, the verification step is able to determine the subset of all messages belonging to a batch verification that are correct. Because when the message is 125, the rate of fault tolerance is the highest. So we modify this scheme to a fault-tolerant batch verification scheme which tolerate two errors in 125 signatures as follows:
1) We construct a 2-cover-free family that can tolerate at most 2 invalid signatures when the total number of signatures is less than 125. As shown in [9] , we have a 2-cover-free family and . Thus, we obtain the incidence matrix :
2) According to the incidence matrix , the RSU divides the 125 signatures into 25 groups. We use to describe each group, where . We use to indicate each signature of a message, where . For , if , we add to the group . 3) The RSU verifies the validity of each , which can determine the subset of all messages belonging to the group that are signed correctly. Finally, the RSU outputs a list of valid signed messages and leave out other invalid messages. Suppose a group messages is . For , and . The batch verification of these signatures is executed as follows: a) For , the verifier computes , where . b) Take random numbers from and check whether the following equation holds:
If it holds, a group of signatures is valid. Notice by our setting, if the number of error signatures is less than or equal to 2 in 125 signatures, the scheme can find all the correct signatures. However, if the number of faulty signatures is greater than 2, the scheme can only find some of the correct signatures. Since we do not need to transfer all the messages to the cloud for data analysis in VANETs, so if the number of faulty signature is greater than 2, we will only transfer completely correct messages to the cloud, and discard uncertain messages.
Trace
Malicious vehicles may exist in VANETs. They can send fake messages to cheat RSUs. If an RSU finds a bogus message and the corresponding signature is valid, the TA just needs to search the member list for a tuple , and then it may find the real identity of the message generator.
Evaluation
We show that our proposed scheme meets all the security and privacy requirements. The signature of our proposed scheme is essentially an identity-based signature from gap Diffie-Hellman groups, which is already proved to be secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. So non-repudiation and message authentication are satisfied in the scheme. And because the random numbers are used in batch verification, the security of digital signature is still maintained. For identity privacy, a vehicle uses the pseudonym to communicate with other vehicles or RSUs. In addition, the TA can find the real identity for a pseudonym, thus the traceability is fulfilled.
We also performed several simulations to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme using cryptographic library MIRACL, NS-2 and VanetMobisim. According to our simulations, the total time of verifying 125 signatures is .. And if the number of fault signatures is 2 in 125 signatures, all valid signatures will be found out. And if this value is 3, about ten percent of the messages will be discarded.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a secure and privacy-preserving scheme for cloud assisted VANET. Our scheme is designed to use batch verification to verify the messages received by RSUs. Besides, the scheme also enables fault-tolerance by using d-cover-free family, which can avoid the influence of transmission errors and so on.
